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THE HEART OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE:
AFFIRMING EQUALITY AND FREEDOM IN PUBLIC
EDUCATION
William E. Thro*

I. INTRODUCTION
Once you start dividing the community from whom the
Constitution works into "goodies" and "badies," then I think
you wander away from the heart of the constitutional
enterprise.
-Justice Albie Sachs, Constitutional Court of South Africa 1

Justice Sachs wrote those words to describe his approach
when writing the opinion establishing a constitutional right to
same-sex marriage in South Africa. 2 He did not want an
opinion that regarded gay rights advocates as "a manipulative
lobby group" or their religious opponents as "a bunch of
benighted bigots." 3 Rather, he wanted both sides to feel that
their "convictions, values, and perspectives are being taken
seriously and treated thoughtfully and with respect." 4 While
South Africa's Constitution mandated a particular result, it
was imperative that no individual feel isolated from the
constitutional community. Affirmation of one constitutional
value-no sexual orientation discrimination-could not
eviscerate another constitutional value-freedom of religion. 5

*

University Counsel & Assistant Professor of Government, Christopher Newport
University. B.A. Hanover College (1986); M.A, University of Melbourne (1988); J.D.,
University of Virginia (1990). Mr. Thro writes in his personal capacity and his views do
not represent the views of the Attorney General of Virginia.
1. ALBIE SACHS, THE STRANGE ALCHEMY OF LIFE AND LAW 2:39 (2009).
2. See Minister of Home Affairs u. Fourie 2006 (9) SA 521 (CC).
:3. SACHS, supra note 1, at 2:39.
4. /d.
5. ld. at 240.

571

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOUIU\AL

572

[2011

In other words, the opinion of the Court must affirm both
equality and freedom.
Although the South African Constitution 6 is fundamentally
different from the United States Constitution and although the
South African Constitutional Court's analytical approach is
substantially different from that of the Supreme Court, 7
.Justice Sachs' wisdom is equally applicable to America."
Constitutional law is not a zero sum game. The affirmation of
one constitutional value does not require the subordination or
denial of another constitutional value. Tt is possible to have a
strong national government and maintain the sovereignty of
the states 9 lt is possible to have a vigorous and energetic
president whik respecting the clear prerogatives of both
Congress and the judiciary. 10 Most significantly, it is possible
to have equality without sacrificing freedom. Indeed, ensuring
the affirmation of both equality and freedom is the "heart of the
constitutional enterprise." 11
As our nation confronts demands for state recognition of
same-sex marriage, 12 our jurists and policymakers must heed

6. When the white minority in South Africa voluntarily snrrPrtrlererl it:s control
of thl' government to hlack majority in the early 1990\:;, o.ll segments of the multi-racial
society negotiated u Constitution. For a discussion of thosP negutintions . .c:re LJ.
l{AUTENBACH &

MOTAL.A

&

E.F.J. MALHERBIE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 17-:.n (1th

(\il. ~00·1);

ZIYAI)

CYRIL RAMAPHOSA, CO:-.JRTTTUT10~AL LAW: ANALYSIS & C1\SES 1-11 (2002).

See MARKS. KENDE, CO~STJTUTIONAL HWH'l'S IN TWO WORLDS: SOUTH AFRIC..\
UI\TTI<:D STATE~ 8--10 (2009) (describing how the South Afriean Constitutional
Court's approach to constitutional interpretation differs from that of the Supreme
Court of thP Unib~rl Stab:s).
8. This docs not mean t.haL the Supreme Court should adopt or (:ven rply on the
law of anoth(:r nation. Ratht>r, it simply means that Justice Sachs offers a wise insight.
J\,:, explained elscwhure, thu Amet·iean Constitution and our !eg:ll s_yst.em arf' uniqllL'.
See William E. Thro, AmPrican Rxception.alism: Some 71wughts on Sanchez·llmnas v.
Oregon, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 219 (2007).
9. ThP Constitution "split. the a torn of sowreignty" hy "l'stahlishing two orders of
government, L'aeh with its own direct. n•lationship, its own privity, it.s own set of
mutual rights and obligations to the pcoplu who sustain iL and an: ~overned by it." U.S.
Term Limits v. Thornton, fil-1 U.S. 77!). H:$H (Hm5) (Kennedy, ,_1., concurring). This
division of soverei~nty hetween the states and the national {;ovvrnmcnt "i,s a dcrining
f!'ature of our nation's eonstitutional hhwprint." Fed. Mar. Comrn'n v. S.C. State Ports
Auth .. fi:1fl U.S. 71:~, 751 (2002).
10. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Aceountin!-!: Own.;ight Bd., 1:~0 S. Ct. :n:l,":l,
:lJGfi-57 (20 10).
11. William K Thro & Charle}i ,J. l{u,;:;o, ;\ Serio118 Se/.l)(lc;/~ for Freedom.: The
lmplicalion8 of Christian Legal Society v. M arti.nez, 2fi 1 EllLIC. L. Rl·~l'. 17::), 47;~ (20 10).
12. Whilt' it is dangerous t.o asSlliDP that the pn•.sent direction of puhlic opinion
will eonlinue. it seems likely that many states (!VPntually will hav(> some sort of stat.e
recognition of sHmL'-sex unionR, hut this n'eognition might not. inclu(k• tlw tt:"nn
''marriage." It seems certain that many people of faith-whether tlwy are Christian,
7.

AND

Tm~
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Justice Sachs' warning-do not divide the constitutional
community. 13 Regardless of whether government recognizes
same-sex relationships and regardless of whether government
describes that recognition as "marriage," 14 the state must treat
gays and lesbians as full and equal members of society. 15 Our
Constitution does not tolerate classes among its citizens. 16
Statutes that criminalize certain sexual acts 17 must apply with
equal force to both homosexuals and heterosexuals. 18 Similarly,
even if every state eventually recognizes same-sex marriage,
government may not prescribe what is orthodox in politics 19 or
punish religious belie£.2° Government must not persecute
people of faith 21 or undermine private charities. 22 The

Jew, or Muslim-will continue to reject the idea that a same-sex union is equivalent to
their faith's definition of marriage.
1:l. SACHS, supra note 1, at 239.
11. Government may choose to defuse some of the objections to same-sex
marriage hy recognizing same-sex "civil unions" hut reserving "marriage" for opposite
sex coupkes. Assuming that the requirements for entering or leaving a civil union are
identical to those for marriage and assuming that the legal benefits are identical, the
only difference between marriage and civil unions would he semantic and symbolic. In
many contexts, particularly religious contexts, issues of semantics and symbols are
enormously important.
15. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 6il1-il6 (1996).
16. /d. at 62::\. See also Plessy v. Ferguson, 16::\ U.S. 5il7, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J.
dissenting).
17. At first blush, Lawrence v. Texas, 5:39 U.S. 558 (2003), appears to preclude
government from ever criminalizing oral or anal sex. Yet, upon closer examination, a
more complex picture emerges. Despite its use of seemingly sweeping language, the
holding in Lawrence is actually "a narrow as-applied holding." Utah v. Holm, 137 !'.3d
736, 712-13 (Utah 2006). Properly understood, Lawrence forbids any governmental
"intrusion upon a person's liberty interest when that interest is exercised in the form of
private, consensual sexual conduct between adults." Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.K2d 367,
370 (Va. 2005). In particular, Lawrence "explained that the liberty interest at issue was
not a fundamental right to engage in certain conduct hut was the right to enter and
maintain a personal relationship without governmental interference." !d. at :369
(emphasis added) (citation omitted). While Lawrence established "a greater respect
than previously existed in the law for the right of consenting adults to engage in
private sexual conduct," Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children & Family Servs., il58 F.3d
801, 815-16 (11th Cir. 2001), it has no impact on the ability of the states to prosecute
sexual conduct between an adult and a minor, McDonald v. Va., 615 S.K2d 918, 922
(Va. 2007); U.S. v. Bach, 100 F.3d 622, 628-29 (8th Cir. 2005), or sexual conduct that
occurs in public, Singson v. Va., 621 S.K2d 682, 688-9:3 (Va. App. 2005); Tjan v. Va.,
621 S.E.2d 669, 672-7G (Va. App. 2005) (both holding that the Commonwealth may
criminalizc sexual conduct that occurs in public).
18. Lawrence, 5:39 U.S. at 579-8::\ (O'Connor, J. concurring).
19. W.Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, :l19 U.S. 624, 612 (1913).
20. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 (2005).
21. See Douglas W. Kmiec, Same Sex Marria&e and the Coming
Antidiscrimination Campai&ns A&ainst Religion, in SAME-SEX MARRTACE AND
RELI(;IOUS LIBERTY 10:l (Douglas Laycock, Anthony R. l'icarello, Jr. & Robin Fretwell
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affirmation of equality must not result in the subordination of
freedom and vice versa. Rather, the Constitution must affirm
both equality and freedom. 23
Affirming both equality and freedom IS particularly
challenging in the context of public education. Public
education, whether in the context of K-12 or higher education,
brings together people of different races, generations, socioeconomic classes, faiths, and values. Indeed, public education
arguably is the most diverse segment of American society.
Moreover, the young frequently express themselves with
rhetoric that is rough rather than refined and in a manner that
is dramatic instead of dignified. Escalation is all too common
and too easy. In this environment, potential for conflict and
misunderstanding is exponentially greater than in society. Yet,
gays and lesbians justifiably demand that government schools
and universities treat them with dignity and equality.
Similarly,
people
of faith
and
political
dissenters
understandably demand that their freedoms do not disappear
at the schoolhouse gate. 24
This article seeks to ensure public education does not
"wander away from the heart of the constitutional enterprise"
as our nation grapples with same-sex marriage. 25 Its purpose is
to prevent public education from favoring equality over
freedom, or vice versa. It aims to promote the affirmation of
equality for homosexuals and freedom for those who disagree
with same-sex marriage. While a discussion of all the possible
constitutional issues related to the consequences of state
recognition of same-sex unions in public education contexts
would be a monumental work and well beyond the scope of this
article and this symposium, it is possible to articulate some

Wilson, eds., 2008).
22. See Jonathon Turley, An Unholy Union: Same-Sex Marriage and the Use of
Governmental Programs to Penalize Reli!{ious Groups with Unpopular Practices, in
SAME-SEX MAIUHAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 59 (Douglas Laycock, Anthony R
Picarello, Jr., & Robin Fretwell Wilson, eds., 2008).
2:l. The affirmation of freedom is important to both advocates of same-sex
marriage and those who disagree with the transformation of a vital societal institution.
"Religious groups and gay rights groups share common ground in the need for freedom
of association. Both are vulnerable (in different parts of the country) to the hostile
reactions of university administrators and fellow students." Drief of the Petitioner at
58, Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010) (No. 08-1:371).
21. Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 39:l U.S. 50:l, 506 (1969).
25. SACHS, supra note 1, at 2:39.
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general principles. 26 Those general principles will guide jurists,
policy-makers, and educational administrators.
This article has three parts. The first part discusses the
constitutional value of equality in the context of same-sex
marriage. Although government may not engage in irrational
sexual orientation discrimination, the national Constitution
does not require recognition of same-sex marriage. Rather, the
states, in the exercise of their sovereignty, may choose to
establish same-sex marriage, but are not required to recognize
same-sex marriages performed in other states. The second part
exammes the constitutional value of freedom and its
significance for those who have political or theological
objections to state recognition of same-sex unions. These rights
include the freedom of speech, including the freedom of
association, the freedom of parents to direct the upbringing of
their children, and the freedom of religion. The third part
explains how public education may affirm both the equality of
homosexuals and the freedom of those who oppose same-sex
marriage. Specifically, public schools and universities must
refrain from sexual orientation discrimination, must respect
the right of faculty to express positions on same sex-marriage,
and must allow students, whether individually or in groups, to
advocate on issues related to same-sex marriage. In some
instances, student groups may have greater rights under the
state constitutions or state law.

II.
A.

EQUALITY

Government May Not Engage in Irrational Sexual
Orientation Discrimination

The Equal Protection Clause, 27 which applies to ''persons,
not groups," 2 x is "essentially a direction that all persons

26. Constitutional problems in public education-like constitutional problems in
other areas-are always context specific. A subtle change in policy or circumstances
may create or alleviate constitutional problems.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
28. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peiia, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). See also City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 188 U.S. 469,494 (1989); Wygantv. Jackson Bd. ofEduc.,
476 U.S. 267, 279-80 (1986). Indeed, the "rights created by the first section of the
Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the individual. The rights
established are Pl'rsonal rights." Shelley v. Kraemer, 331 U.S. 1, 22 (1948).
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similarly situated ... be treated alike." 29 If a program treats
everyone equally, there is no equal protection violation. 30 The
"general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will
be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is
rationally related to a legitimate state interest." 31 At the same
time, this general rule gives way in those rare instances when
statutes infringe upon fundamental constitutional rights or
utilize "suspect" or "quasi -suspect" classifications. 32 Because
racial classifications "are by their very nature odious to a free
people whose institutions are founded on the doctrine of
equality" 33 and "call for the most exacting judicial
examination," 34 they are, regardless of their purpose, 35
"constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to further
compelling governmental interests." 36 Similarly, classifications
based on gender are subject to "quasi-strict scrutiny" and are
valid only if the classifications (1) serve important
governmental objectives; and (2) substantially relate to the
achievement of those objectives. 37 In contrast, classifications
based upon age, 3 x disability, 39 income, 40 or sexual orientation41
receive rational basis scrutiny. The law or policy is
constitutional unless it "lacks a rational relationship to
legitimate state interests."42

29. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 178 U.S. 1:l2, 1:l9 (1985).
30. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996).
31. Cleburne. 473 U.S. at 440; Schweiker v. Wilson, 150 U.S. 221, 2:m (1981).
32. Cleburne, 47:l U.S. at 110-41; Graham v. Richardson, 10:i U.S. :l65 (1971);
Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
33. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 6:l0, 613 (1993).
34. Bakke v. Bd. of Regl,nts of the Univ. of Cal., 1:l8 U.S. 265. 291 (1978).
35. Indeed, the Court has "insisted on strict scrutiny in every context, even f(Jr socalled 'benign' racial classifications, such as race-conscious university admissions
policies, race-based preferences in government contracts, and race-based districting
intended to improve minority n'presentation." .Johnson v. Cal., 51:! U.S. 49~1. 505
(2005) (citations omitted).
36. Grutter v. Bollingl,r, 539 U.S. il06, :l26 (2003) (citations omitted).
37. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 158 U.S. 718, 724 (1982); Craig v. Boren.
129 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
38. Vance v. Bradley, 110 U.S. 9:i, 97 (1979).
39. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 173 U.S. 1:l2, 1:l9-10 (1985).
40. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriqtwz, 411 U.S. 1, 18-21 (197:l).
41. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 62:i (1996).
42. !d. at 632.

2]

HEART OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE 577

B.

The National Constitution Does Not Require Recognition of
Same-Sex Marriage

While the Constitution prohibits irrational sexual
orientation discrimination, this does not mean that the
Constitution requires same-sex marriage. 43 If the state chooses
to recognize marriage-and there is no constitutional
obligation for the state to do so 44-then the state may restrict
marriage to opposite couples. 45 Quite simply, it is rational for
the state to adopt the definition of marriage that has
dominated human culture for the past four millennia. 46
Moreover, if the protections of the Due Process Clause are
limited to "those fundamental rights and liberties which are
objectively, deeply rooted in this nation's history and tradition,
and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither
liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed," 47 then
the fundamental right to marry 4 x does not encompass same-sex
marriage. 49
4C1. nut see Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 701 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
(holding that, if the states recogni?-e traditional marriage, the national Constitution
requires the states to recognize same-sex marriage), stay denied, 702 F. Supp. 2d 11 :32
(N.D. Cal. 201 0). For the reasons stated in the monumental opening brief of the
Defendant-Intervenors-Appellees, I believe it is doubtful that tbe reasoning and logic of
Perry will survive appldlate review. See Brief of Defendant-Intervenor-Appellees at 1:l11:1, Perry v. Schwarzenl~gger, No. 10-16966 (9th Cir. 2010).
44. A state "has absolute right to prescribe the conditions upon which the
marriage relation betwm~n its own citizens shall be created, and the causes for which it
may be dissolved." Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 711, 734-:35 (1878). See also Sosna v.
Iowa, 419 U.S. 39:3, 101 (1975). Thus, "a Statl' may legitimately say that no one can
marry his or her sibling, that no one can marry who is not at least 14 years old, that no
one can marry without first passing an examination for venereal disease, or that no one
can marry who has a living husband or wife." Zablocki v. Redhail, 1:-31 U.S. :-371, :-392
(1978) (Stewart, J., concurring).
45. See Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 155 F.3d 859, 867-68 (8th Cir. 2006).
Moreover, in Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972), the Supreme Court dismissed an
appeal of Minnesota's refusal to grant marriage license to same sex couple for lack of a
substantial fl,deral question. Unlike a denial of certiorari, a dismissal of an appeal for
lack of a substantial federal question is a decision on the merits. See Mandel v.
Bradley, 1il2 U.S. 17a, 176 (1977) (per curiam).
46. nruning, 455 F.:1d at 867-68. See also Brief of Defendant-IntervenorAppellees at 75-11:1, Perry v. Schwar?-enegger, No. 10-16966 (9th Cir. 2010).
47. Washington v. Glucksberg 521 U.S. 702, 720-22 (1997). See also Dist.
Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2:l22 (2009) (reiterating the Glucksber!J
standard). cr. McDonald V. City of Chi., 1 :-lo S. Ct. 3020, :l0c14-36 (2010) (adopting
similar standard for determining when a provision of the Bill of Rights is incorporated
against the States).
48. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
49. See Brief of Defendant-Intervenor-Appellees at 4 7-69, Perry v.
Schwarzeneggcr, No. 10-16966 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining why the right to marry a
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Establishment of Same-Sex Marriage is Within the States'
Sovereign Sphere

1. Exercising its sovereignty, a state may choose to establish
same-sex marriage
"An integral component of that 'residuary and inviolable
sovereignty' retained by the States," 50 is control over domestic
relations. 51 "Family relations are a traditional area of state
concern," 52 and "domestic relations are preeminently matters of
state law." 53 "The whole subject of the domestic relations of
husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the
states and not to the laws of the United States." 54 Thus, the
states, in the exercise of their sovereignty, 55 may choose to
establish same-sex marriage 56 or may decline to do so. 57
Unfortunately, the judiciary frequently interferes with this
sovereign choice. Indeed, of the five states that allow same-sex
marnage, only New Hampshire did so without judicial

person of the same sex is not firmly rooted in the nation's history).
50. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 5:l5 U.S. 71:l, 751-52 (2002).
51. See I£lk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 512 U.S. 1, 12-1:l (2004).
52. Moore v. Sims, 112 U.S. 115, 1:35 (1979).
5:3. Mansell v. Mansell, 190 U.S. 581, 587 (1989).
54. Rose v. Hose, 181 U.S. 619, 625 (1987).
55. Prior to the adoption of the Constitution, the thirteen states effectively were
thirteen sovereign nations. See Blatchford v. Native Viii. of Noatak. 501 U.S. 775. 779
(1991).
56. Massachusetts, Connecticut, Iowa, Vermont, and New Hampshire have
established same-sex marriage.
57. Exercising their sovereignty, the people of twenty-nine states have rejected
same-sex marriage. See ALA. CON ST. art. I, § :36.0:3; ALASKA CON ST. art. 1, § 25; Arm~.
CONST. art. XXX,§ 1; AI1K. CONS'!'. amend. 83, §§ 1-:i; CAL. CONS'!'. art. I,§ 7.5; COLO.
CONST. art. II, § 31; FIA CON ST. art. I § 27; GA. CONS'!'. art. I, § IV. ,[ i; IDAHO CON ST.
art. III,§ 28; KAN. CONS'!'. art. XV,§ 16; KY. CONS'!'.§ 2:lila; LA. CONS'!'. art. XII,§ 15;
MICH. CONS'l'. art. I, § 25; MISS. CONS'!'. art. XIV, § 26ila; Mo. CONS'!'. art. I, § 33; MONT.
CONS'!'. art. XIII,§ 7; NEB. CONST. art. I,§ 29; NEV. CONS'!'. art. I,§ 21; N.D. CONST. rt.
X, § 28; OHIO CON ST. art. XV, § 11; OKLA. CONS'!'. art. ll, § :l5; OiL CON ST. art. XV, § 5a;
S.C. CONST. art. XVII,§ 15; S.D. CONST. art. XXI,§ 9; TENN. CONS'!'. art. XI,§ 18; TEX.
CONST. art. I, § :32; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29; VA. CONS'!'. art. I. § Hi-a; Wrs. CONST. art.
XIII, § 1:i.
Moreover, several states have enacted statutes n,affirming the traditional
view of marriage. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 101 (201 0); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 572-1.
572-:3 (2010); 750 ILL. COM!'. STAT. 5/212 (2010); lNil. COilE § :31-11-1-1 (2010); ME.
REV. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 701.5 (2011); MD. CODE, FAM. LAW§ 2-2()1 (LexisNexis 2011);
MINN. STAT.§ 517.01 (2010); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 51-1.2 (2010); 2:l l'A. CONS. STAT.§
1704 (2011); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.010 through .020 (2011); W. VA. CODE § 48-260:3 (2011); WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 20-1-101 (2010). See also 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2011); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 10-1-1 through 10-1-7 (201 0); IU. GEN. LAWS§§ 15-1-1 through 15-1-5 (2010).
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intervention. ss In Vermont, the judiciary mandated recognition
of same-sex unions, 59 and the legislature later decided to
recognize same-sex marriage. 60 In Connecticut, 61 Iowa, 62 and
Massachusetts, 63
the judiciary interpreted the state
constitution as requiring same-sex marriage. 64
Such judicial intervention into the state's sovereign choice
is problematic. Because an expansive judicial interpretation
endures until the people amend the state constitution, 65 courts
"must never forget that it is a constitution we are
expounding." 66 Constitutions are "intended to endure for ages
to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises
of human affairs." 67 Constitutions "are not ephemeral
enactments, designed to meet passing occasions . . . . The
future is their care and provision for events of good and bad
tendencies of which no prophecy can be made." 68 When
confronting a challenge, judges must recognize that they are
not "a bevy of Platonic Guardians" 69 as the "myth of the legal
profession's omnicompetence ... was exploded long ago." 70
"There was a time when [the judiciary] presumed to make such
binding judgments for society, under the guise of interpreting

58. Sec N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 457:1 (2011) et seq.
59. See Baker v. Vermont, 711 A.2d 844 (Vt. 1999).
60. See 2009 VT. ACTS & RESOLVES 3.
61. See Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 107 (Conn. 2008).
62. See Varnum v. Brien, 76:3 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
63. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Health, 798 N.E.2d 911 (Mass. 2003).
64. But see Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 l'.:ld 151 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004),
review denied sub nom, Standhart v. MCSC, No. CV-O:l-0122-PR, 2001 Ariz. LEXIS
62 (Ariz. May 25, 20(11); Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15 (Ind. Ct. App.
2005); Conaway v. Deane, 9:32 A.2d 219 (Md. 2007); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185
(Minn. 1971) (rejecting the argument that the state constitution requires same-sex
marriage); Hernandez v. llobles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006); Andersen v. King County,
138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006). See also Dean v. D.C., 65il A.2d :l07 (D.C. 1995) (per
curiam).
65. This is exactly what happened in California. The Supreme Court of California
held that the California Constitution required same-sex marriage. See In re Marriage
Cases, 183 P.3d 381 (Cal. 2008). The people then amended their constitution to prohibit
same-sex marriage. Sec Cal. Const. art. I, § 7.5. Of course, a federal judge subsequently
held that the constitutional amendment violated the federal Constitution. See Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 701 F. Supp. 2d at 921, 991-1004 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
66. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 107 (1819).
67. Id. at 415.
68. Weems v. U.S., 217 U.S. 349, :373 (1910).
69. Griswold v. Connecticut, :l81 U.S. 479, 51:3 (1965) (Black, ,J., dissenting).
70. People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of gduc. Sch. Dist. No. 205, 111 F.3d 528,
536 (7th Cir. 1997).
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the Due Process Clause. We should not seek to reclaim that
ground for judicial supremacy ... " 71 Absent a clear violation of
the constitutional text and structure, jurists should uphold
even "uncommonly silly" laws and policies. 72
In sum, if a state is going to adopt same-sex marriage, the
decision should come from the legislature or from a popularly
enacted amendment to the state constitution. The
transformation of marriage should not come from the judiciary
suddenly declaring that the meaning of the state constitution
has "evolved." 73

2. A state may decline to recognize a same-sex marriage
performed in another state
.

.

A state may decline to recogmze a same-sex marnage
performed in another state. The "very purpose" of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause was:
to alter the status of the several states as independent foreign
sovereignties, each free to ignore obligations created under
the laws or by the judicial proceedings of the others, and to
make them integral parts of a single nation throughout which
a remedy upon a just obligation might be demanded as of
right, irrespective of the state of its origin. 74

Yet, "the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require a
State to apply another State's law in violation of its own
legitimate public policy." 75 "Nor is there any authority which
lends support to the view that the Full Faith and Credit Clause
compels the courts of one state to subordinate the local policy of
that state, as respects its domiciliaries, to the statutes of any
other state." 76 Indeed, a state is not compelled to "[s]ubstitute
the statutes of other States for its own statutes dealing with a
subject matter concerning which it is competent to legislate." 77
"Neither the Due Process Clause nor Full Faith and Credit

71. United Haulers v. Oneida Harkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth .. 127 S. Ct.
1786, 1798 (2007) (citation omitted).
72. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
7:3. None of the state constitutions has an explicit provision h'11arantecing samesex marriage. In the absence of such explicit provisions, it is difficult to argue that the
state constitution's text mandates recognition of same-sex marriage.
71. Milwaukee Cnty. v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 276-77 (1935).
75. Nevada v. Hall. 110 U.S. 110, 122 (1979).
76. Williams v. North Carolina, :31 7 U.S. 287, 296 (1912).
77. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 188. ·19:3-91 (2003).
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Clause requires [a state] 'to substitute for its own [laws],
applicable to persons and events within it, the conflicting
statute of another state."' 78 If the public policy exception allows
a state to refuse to recognize the sovereign immunity of
another state, 79 then surely a state may refuse a marriage
performed in another state that is contrary to the state's
fundamental law.

Ill. FREEDOM
As explained above, the issue of whether to have same-sex
marriage ultimately is a decision for each state. Yet, no matter
what a state decides with respect to same-sex marriage, those
who agree or disagree with that decision retain certain
freedoms.

A.

Freedom of Speech

Individuals who disagree with the state on same-sex
marriage have the right to express their disagreement. 80 "The
proudest boast of our free speech jurisprudence is that we
protect the freedom to express 'the thought that we hate.'" 81
"The First Amendment's guarantee of free speech does not
extend only to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc
balancing of relative social costs and benefits," 82 but also
"embraces such a heated exchange of views, even (perhaps
especially) when they concern sensitive topics like race, where
the risk of conflict and insult is high." 83 "While the law is free
to promote all sorts of conduct in place of harmful behavior, it
is not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than

78. Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 822-23 (1985).
79. Srr Hyatt, 588 U.S. at -196-98.
80. Although some may object to a pro- or anti-same-sex marriage message, the
Court has consistently rejected attempts to han speech that is offensive to the
audience. See U.S. v. Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. 80:l, 814-816 (2000); R.A.V. v. St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 877, 882 (1992); Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26
v. Pico. 457 U.S. 85:l, 871-872 (1982) (plurality opinion); Tinker v. Des Moines lndep.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 898 U.S. 508, 508-09 (1969).
81. Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 180 S. Ct 2971, 8000 (2010) (Alito, J.,
joined hy Roberts, C.J., Scalia, & Thomas JJ., dissenting) (quoting U.S. v. Schwimmer,
279 U.S. 6-1-1,65-1-55 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
82. UnitPd StatPs v. StPvens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010).
sa. ]{odriguez v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coli. Dist., 605 F.ad 70:3, 708 (9th Cir.
2010). See also R.A. V., 505 U.S. at :l91.
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promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored
one, however enlightened either purpose may strike the
governmenL."s 4 "[A]s is true of all expressions of First
Amendment freedoms, the courts may not interfere on the
ground that they view a particular expression as unwise or
irrational."x 5 Indeed, "it is axiomatic that the government may
nol silence speech because the ideas it promotes are thought to
he offcnsivc."X 6
Moreover, "[a]n individual's freedom to speak, to worship,
and to petition the governmrmt for the redress of grievances
could not be vigorously protected from interference by the Stale
unless a correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward
those ends were not also guaranteed."X 7 "This right is crucial in
preventing the majority from imposing its views on groups that
would rather express other, perhaps unpopular, idcas."xx "If the
government were free to restrict individuals' ability lo join
together and speak, it could essentially silence views that the
First Amendment is intended to protect."x 9 This freedom of
association "is not reserved for advocacy groups. But to come
within its ambit, a group must engage in some form of
expression, whether it be public or private." 90

B.

Parental Rights

The Constitution protects "the fundamental right of parents
to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of
their childrcn." 91 "The child is not the mere creature of the
state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the
right, coupled with the high dLtty, to recognize and prepare him
for additional obligations." 92 Since "the custody, care and

8-'1. Hurley v.
(1995).

Iri~h-Am.

Gay, Lesbiau & Bisexual Grp. of Bus .. 515 L!.!-'. :};)7, S79

8G. Democratic Part.y of the U.S. v. Wiscon::;in ex rei. LaFollette, ·150 U.[-;. 107. 12·1
(I 9H2).

8G. Uodriuw:z. 603 J<'.Jd at 708. See also Brandenburg v. Ohio, :195 U.S. ·1·H, .-HH48, (HJGB); Saxe v. State Cull. Area Seh. Dist., 240 F.:3d 200. 204 (:1d Cir. 2001 ):
Dt•Ang-elis v. F:l Pa:;o Mun. Polict~ Offil't>r::o; As<J'n, 51 F.:1d !191, 5~)()-...97 (5th Cir. 19!-};)).
H7. Hohert.s v. U.S. ,Ja.vct:PH. 46H lJ.S. WJ$1, f)22 (1 9H1).
88. Boy .SeouLs of America v. Dalt\ 5:.\0 U.S. 6·10, 617 -rlH (2000).
8~J. Humsfeld v. Forum for Acarlt>mic & lnst'l Rights, S17 U.S. 17. Ol:l (200()).
90. /Jale. 530 lJ.S. at GGO.
91. Troxel v. Cnmvillc. 5:10 U.S. 57,(}() (~000).
92. Pierce v. Soc'y of t.hL' Sisters. 2fiK L .S. G10. G:-:!5 (192;)).
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nurture of the child reside first in the parents," 93 parents may
send their children to private schools, 94 or educate the children
at home. 95

C.

Freedom of Religion

To the extent that one's religious belief compels one to favor
or oppose same sex-marnage, the Constitution absolutely
protects that belie£. 96
Government in our democracy, state and national, must be
neutral in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice.
It may not be hostile to any religion or to the advocacy of no
religion; and it may not aid, foster, or promote one religion or
religious theory against another or even against the militant
opposite. 97

"The door of the Free Exercise Clause stands tightly closed
against any governmental regulation of religious beliefs as
such." 9 x The Constitution "requires government respect for,
and noninterference with, the religious beliefs and practices of
our Nation's people." 99 "No person can be punished for
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for
church attendance or nonattendance." 100 "Government may
neither compel affirmation of a repugnant belief, nor penalize
or discriminate against individuals or groups because they hold
religious views abhorrent to the authorities nor employ the
taxing power to inhibit the dissemination of particular religious

93. Prince v. Massachusetts, ::321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
91. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 531-35.
95. See Peterson v. Minidoka Sch. Dist. No. ::331, 118 F.:ld 1351, 1::357 (9th Cir.
1997) (First Amendment right of free exercise includes right to home school a child);
Murphy v. Arkansas, 852 F.2d 1039, 1043 (8th Cir. 1988) (acknowledging the right to
home school a child, but upholding state regulation of that right). To date, more than
thirty states have enacted statutes that allow parents to home school their children. In
the remainder of states, home schooling is legal pursuant to a variety of types of
regulations.
96. Feldblum suggests that Court should treat religious claims "as belief liberty
interests under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,
rather than as free exercise claims under the First Amendment." Chai R. Feldblum,
Moral Conflict and Conflicting Liberties, in SAMl,-SEX MARRTAC~E AND RELlGlOUS
LIBEHTY 123, 125 (Douglas Laycock, Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., & Robin Fretwell
Wilson, eels., 2008).
97. Epperson v. Ark., ::39::3 U.S. 97, 10:Hl4 (1968).
98. Sherbert v. Verner, ::371 U.S. 398, 402-03 (196::3).
99. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 541 U.S. 709, 719 (2005).
100. Everson v. Bel. of Educ., :i:iO U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
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views." 101 Indeed, "religious beliefs need not be acceptable,
logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to
merit First Amendment protection." 102 Thus, religious groups
may profess any beliefs they wish and may exclude those who
disagree with their beliefs. 103 Insofar as the state is not
required "to be oblivious to impositions that legitimate
exercises of state power may place on religious belief and
practice," 104 the government may treat religious organizations
more favorably than non-religious groups without violating the
Establishment Clause. 105
While belief is absolutely protected, "the right of free
exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to
comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability on
the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that
his religion prescribes (or proscribes)."' 106 Thus, "a law that is
neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a
compelling governmental interest even [if] the law has the
incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice." 107
In determining whether a law is neutral and generally
applicable, judges must ask if "the object of the law is to
infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious
motivation" 108 and if the law "in a selective manner impose
burdens only on conduct motivated by religious belie£." 109
"Neutrality and general applicability are interrelated, and

101. Sherbert. :374 U.S. at 108.
102. Thomas v. l{eview Bd. of Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 711 (19H1).
10:1. See generally Corp. of Presiding Bishop of the Church of ,Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 11-\3 U.S. :!27, 3:34-40 (1987).
104. Ed. ofEduc. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687,705 (1991).
105. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 541 U.S. 709, 719-21 (2005) (Religious Land Usl' and
Institutionalized Persons Act, which requires preferential treatment for religion, dm's
not violate the Establishment Clause). See also Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 189 U.S. 1,
18 n.8 (1989) ("[Wje in no way suggest that all benefits confl,rred cxclusivl,ly upon
religious groups or upon individuals on account of their religious beliefs an• forbiddcn
by thl' Establishment Clause unless they are mandated by thc Free Excrcisl' Clause."):
Amos, 11-\3 U.S. at :3:35 (recognizing that the govcrnml,nt may sometiml'S accommodate
religious practices without violating the Establishment Clause).
106. Emp't Div. v. Smith, 191 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). See also U.S. v. Lee. 155 U.S.
252, 26:) n.:) (1982) (Stevens, J .. concurring). The Court first enunciated this principle
in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 115 (1878) (rejecting a Free Exercise Clause
challenge to a federal polygamy statute).
107. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 5:31
(1998).
108. /d. at 5:3:1.
109. ld. at 513.
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failure to satisfy one requirement is a likely indication that the
other has not been satisfied." 110
IV. AFFIRMING BOTH EQUALITY AND FREEDOM IN PUBLIC
EDUCATION

Although all controversial political issues are problematic
for public education, 111 the issue of same-sex marriage goes far
beyond objections to the curricular treatment of the issue. 112 In
many ways, the debate over same-sex marriage, like all
debates over gay rights, is a "clash between those who believe
that homosexual conduct is immoral and those who believe that
it is a natural and morally unobjectionable manifestation of
human sexuality." 113 As Eugene Volokh observed, one goal of
the gay rights movement is "delegitimizing and legally
punishing private behavior that discriminates against or
condemns homosexuals." 114 Kmiec believes, "apparently one of
the main aspirations of the homosexual movement is
retaliation against the defenders of traditional marriage." 115 As
the Constitution allows the government to punish private
religious organizations that advocate racist views, 116
government logically could punish those who oppose same-sex
marriage or regard homosexual conduct as sinful. 117 In an
environment where some want not only to affirm equality, but

110. /d.at531.
111. See David Schimmel symposium piece.
112. For a discussion of curricular objections, see generally Charles J. Russo, The
Child is Not the Mere Creature of The State: Controversy over Teaching About Same-Sex
Marriage in Public Schools, 2:32 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2008); Charles J. Russo & William E.
Thro, Curricular Control and Parental Rights: Balancing the Rights of Educators and
Parents in American Public Schools, 12 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. L. & Enuc. 91 (2007).
113. Michael McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV.
1, 1::3~11 (2000). See also l<'eldhlum, supra note 96, at 1::J:l~:l4 (discussing McConnell).
11 !J. Eugene Volokoh, Same-Sex Marriage and Slippery Slopes, 33 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1155, 11 78 (2005).
115. Kmiec, supra note 21, at 104. Kmiec also notes that some gay rights advocates
have openly declared their intent to discredit and marginalize traditional religious
practices. !d. (quoting Larry W. Shackle, Parading Ourselves: Freedom of Speech at the
Feast of St. l'atrich, 73 B.U. L. REV. 791, 792 (1993)).
116. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 59:5~96 (1983) (denying
tax-exempt status to private religiously affiliated university that espoused racist
beliefs).
117. Kmiec, supra note 21, at 104~05. See also William E. Thro & Charles J.
Russo, A Serious Setbach for Freedom: The Implications of Christian Legal Soc'y v.
Martinez, 261 Enuc. LAW REP. !J7a (2010).
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also to deny freedom to those who disagree, the potential for
explosive confrontation is at its highest. 11 ~ Despite the volatile
nature of the situation, the Constitution requires that public
education affirm both equality and freedom. 119
A.

Public Education Must Not Engage in Sexual Orientation
Discrimination

Regardless of whether a particular state recognizes samesex marriage, government, including institutions of public
education, must refrain from irrational sexual orientation
discrimination against employees and students. 120 Government
may not deny employment or the ability to study simply
because of one's sexual orientation. Similarly, the state may
not deny opportunities because an individual is involved in a
same-sex marriage or advocates for or against same-sex
marriage. To the extent that harassment based on sexual
orientation is discrimination based on sex, 121 educational
institutions must respond effectively to harassment against
students 122 and teachers. 123 Refraining from discrimination
and responding to harassment, which is a form of
discrimination, represents an affirmation of equality. 124

B.

Teachers May Express Their Positions on Same-Sex
Marriage

When speaking outside of the classroom or in their personal
capacities, teachers and professors have the right to express
their approval or disapproval of same sex-marriage. 125 Public
118. See Charles ,J. ]{us so symposium piece.
119. See Alii Fetter-Harrott symposium piece.
120. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 6:3:1-:3-1 (199G).
121. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 52:l U.S. 75, 71-l-82 (1998)
(holding that Title Vll prohibits same-sex sexual harassment).
122. Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of l~duc., 52() U.S. ()29, 650-52 (1999) (Title IX
liability for sexual harassment of student by another student); GeiJSer v. Lago Vista
Indep. Sch. Dist., 521 U.S. 276,288-92 (1998) (Title IX liability for sexual harassment
of student by faculty member).
12:l. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807-09 (1998); Burlington
Indus. v. Ellerth, 521 U.S. 712, 751-65(1998).
121. These steps are the minimum that an educational institution can and must
do. Of course, the institution may do more to affirm equality, but doing more may well
subordinate freedom.
125. However, this right has nothing to do with a claim of individual acadl'mic
freedom. See Urofsky v. Gilmore, 21() F.:ld 101, 115 (lith Cir. 2000) (en bane). Indeed.
"to the extent the Constitution recognizes any right of 'academic freedom' above and
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employees, including public school teachers and faculty
members at state universities, retain broad First Amendment
rights. 126 While the Court recently held that public employees
lack First Amendment rights when speaking in their official
capacities, 127 the Court has "made clear that public employees
do not surrender all their First Amendment rights by reason of
their employment." 12X Thus, while the administration may
require that the faculty member adhere to the institutional
position concerning same-sex marriage when in the classroom
or while representing the school, it may not prevent the faculty
member from criticizing or endorsing same-sex marriage.

C.

Students, As Individuals or In Groups, May Express Their
Positions on Same-Sex Marriage

Subject to restrictions that reflect the unique nature of the
school environment, students may express their approval or
disagreement with same-sex marriage. 129 "Intellectual
advancement has traditionally progressed through discord and
dissent, as a diversity of views ensures that ideas survive
because they are correct, not because they are popular." 130
"Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to
study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and
understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and
die." 131 "Without the right to stand against society's most
strongly-held convictions, the marketplace of ideas would
decline into a boutique of the banal, as the urge to censor is
greatest where debate is most disquieting and orthodoxy most
entrenched." 132

beyond the First Amendment rights to which every citizen is entitled, the right inheres
in the University, not in individual professors." Id. at 410.
126. United States v. Nat'! Treasury Emps. Union, 51:3 U.S. 151 (1995); Connick v.
Myers, 461 U.S. 1:38 (198:3); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., :391 U.S. 56:3 (1968).
127. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 517 U.S. 410, 421-22 (2006).
128. ld. at 117.
129. Morse v. FredL,rick, 551 U.S. :393, 103-10 (2007). See also id. at 422-25 (Alito,
J., joined by Kenm,dy, .J., concurring) (emphasizing the limited ability of government to
control student speech).
1:10. Rodriguez v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coli. Dist., 605 F.:3d 70:3, 708 (9th Cir.
2010).
131. Keyishian v. Bel. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 60:3 (1967).
132. Rodri!Juez, 605 F.:3d at 708. See also Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 667
(1925); id. at 673 (Holmes, .J., dissenting).
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1. Educational institutions must recognize student groups that
advocate for or against same-sex marriage
Similarly, public schools and universities must recogmze
student organizations that advocate for or against same-sex
marriage. Since there is "no doubt that the First Amendment
rights of speech and association extend to [public educational
institutions]," 133 "the mere disagreement of the [institution]
with the group's philosophy affords no reason to deny it
recognition" 134 or funding. 135 In granting recognition and/or
funding, the school or university does not adopt the group's
speech as its own 136 or "confer any imprimatur of state
approval" on the student group. 137 If there were disagreement
with the message of the student groups, then, "[other] students
and faculty are free to associate to voice their disapproval of
the [student organization's] message." 13 X Indeed, in the higher
education context, the practice of requiring students to pay
mandatory fees that are distributed to student groups is
permissible only if institutions do not favor particular
viewpoints. 139 Simply stated, the "avowed purpose" for granting
official status to student organizations is supposed to be "to
provide a forum in which students can exchange ideas." 140
Thus, groups with racist, sexist, homophobic, anti-Semitic, and/
or anti-Christian views are entitled to recognition, access to
facilities, and funding. 141

13:1. Widmar v. Vincent, 151 U.S. 263, 269 (1981).
134. Healy v. Janw~. ·101-l U.S. 169, 187-i-li-l (1972).
135. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. ofVa., 515 U.S. i-319, i-331 (1995).
136. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000).
137. Widmar, 154 U.S. at 274.
138. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & lnst'lRights, 547 U.S. 17, 69-70 (2006).
139. Southworth, 529 U.S. at 233-34.
140. Widmar, 151 U.S. at 272 n.10. See also Southworth, 529 U.S. at 229 (student
activity fee was designed to facilitate the free and open exchange of ideas by, and
among, its students); RosenberJ:er, 515 U.S. at s:l1 (university funded student
organizations to "encourage a diversity of views from private speakers").
141. While institutions may not refuse to recognize student organizations due to
their viewpoints. they may requine organization to (1) obey the campus rules; (2)
refrain from disrupting classes; and (3) obey all applicable fl,deral, state. and local
laws. WILLIAM A. KAPLIN & BARBARA H. LEE, THE LAW OF HJ<:HEJ< EOUCATI0"-1 1051
(4th eel. 2007) (intl,rpreting Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 1()9 (1972)). As a practical
matter, this means that institutions can impose some neutral criteria for recognition
such as having a faculty advisor, a constitution, and a certain number of members.
Even so, institutions cannot <hmy recognition simply because officials or a significant
part of the campus community dislik<'s the organization. Mon,over, according to Healy,
institutions may not <kny recognition because mem])(,rs of organizations at other
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2. State constitutional provisions may allow student groups to
exclude those who disagree with the group's viewpoints
Of course, as a matter of federal constitutional law,
educational institutions may require student groups that favor
or oppose same-sex marriage to admit members who hold the
opposite view as a condition of recognizing the student
organization. In Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 142 a
sharply divided Supreme Court held that officials at a public
institution in California might require an on campus religious
group to admit all-comers from the student body, including
those who disagree with its beliefs, as a condition of being
recognized. 143 Put another way, the Court declared that the
government, through university officials, might force religious
groups to choose between compromising their values and
receiving benefits that other student groups receive as a matter
of constitutional right. While the government "surely could not
demand that all Christian groups admit members who believe
that Jesus was merely human," 144 the government "may
impose these very same requirements on students who wish to
participate in a forum that is designed to foster the expression
of diverse viewpoints." 145 In other words, what the Constitution
forbids government from doing directly, it may accomplish
indirectly by restricting access to the limited-public forum. 146
Yet, while Christian Legal Society resolves the issue as a
matter of federal constitutional law, it does not definitively
resolve the issue of whether educational institutions may force
student groups to admit those who disagree with the group's
ideology. Because state constitutions often are more protective

campuses or in the outside community engaged in certain conduct. Healy, 408 U.S. at
185-1-\6.
112. LlO S. Ct. 2971 (2010). For a comml;ntary on the casl' and its implications, see
Thro & Russo, supra note 117.
Hil. Christian Le!{al Soc:y, 130 S. Ct. at 2978.
111. /d. at 3011 (i\lito, .J., joined hy ltoberts, C ..J., Scalia, .J. & Thomas, .J,J.,
dissenting). See also id. at 2997 (Stevens, .J., concurring).
115. /d. at 3011 (i\lito, .J., joined hy Roberts, C.J., Scalia, ,J. & Thomas, JJ.,
dissenting).
116. l'l;rry v. Sindermann,108 U.S. 59:3, 597 (1972) ("For if the government could
deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected spm;ch or
associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited.
This would allow the government to 'produce a result which (it) could not command
directly.'"). See also O'Hare Truck Serv. v. City of Northlake. 518 U.S. 712, 716-17
(1996).
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of individual liberty, 147 a student group may have a state
constitutional right to exclude those who disagree with the
group's views. 14 ~ Indeed, since the Burger Court's decisions
prompted a revival of state constitutional law in the early
1970s, 149 "it would be most unwise these days not also to raise
the state constitutional questions." 150 Although the issue
apparently is one of national first impression, it would not be
surprising if a state court determined that its state constitution
prohibited the government from indirectly forcing an
organization to admit members who disagreed with the
organization's objectives. 151 Moreover, state religious freedom
restoration acts 152 prohibit government from imposing a
substantial burden on the free exercise of religion unless there
is a compelling governmental interest pursued through the
least restrictive means. 153 To the extent that a student group's
position on same-sex marriage is the result of religious belief,
these state laws seem to prohibit government from indirectly

147. A.E. Dick Howard, The Renaissance of State Constitutional Law, 1 EMEKGINC:
ISSUES IN ST. CONS'!'. L. 1, 1~ (1988).
148. State constitutions are fundamentally diffr,rent from the national
Constitution-the national Constitution is a grant of power and the state constitutions
are limitations on power. Hornbeck v. Somerset Cnty. Bd. of Educ., ~58 A.2d 758, 785
(Md. 1983); Bd. of l~duc. v. Nyquist, 1:39 N.E.2d 359, il66 n.5 (N.Y. 1982). Thus, the
presumptions concerning legislative authority are reversed. Congress may not act
unless it can identify a specific enumerated power, United States v. Morrison. 529 U.S.
598, 607 (2000), but the state legislature may act unless there is an explicit restriction.
Almond v. R.I. Lottpry Comm'n, 756 A.2d 186, 196 (IU. 2000).
1~9. See A E. Dick Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Da.v of
the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 87:3 (1976).
150. William .J. Brennan, State Constitutions and the l'rotection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. ~89, 502 (1977).
151. Indeed, after the U.S. Supreme Court diminished religious freedom in Smith,
several state courts held that the state constitutions provided greater protection for
religious freedom. See Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, The Pledge Of
Allegiance, And Religious l-iberty: Avoiding The 8xtremes, 118 HI\IW. L. R~;v. 155, 21112 (2004) (discussing cases).
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2]

HEART OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE

591

forcing the inclusion of dissenters. In sum, state law may
prohibit what Christian Legal Society permits.
V.

CONCLUSION

Americans define our Nation not by language, religion,
blood, or place, but by two self-evident truths-that all "are
created equal" and that the Creator has endowed us with
"inalienable rights." 154 Under our Constitution, government
may not deny either truth. In affirming equality, the state
must not deny freedom of individuals. In upholding freedom,
government must not diminish equality. As our society
confronts profound questions regarding same-sex marriage, our
public schools and universities must ensure that homosexuals
enjoy full dignity regardless of whether the state recognizes
same-sex marriage. At the same, public education must affirm
freedom-the rights of those who disagree with the state's
position on same-sex marriage. By affirming both equality and
freedom, public education unites the constitutional community.
That is the heart of the constitutional enterprise.
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